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COMMENT
TREATMENT OF DAMAGES FOR DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT IN
SUITS AGAINST COMMON-CARRIERS IN CONFLICT OF
LAWS: THE PLACE OF INJURY RULE
Suppose Chris Passenger, a citizen of State X, bought an airplane ticket in
that state for transportation to State Y. He boarded the airship in State X and
while enroute to his destination he was killed when the plane in which he was
riding crashed and burned in State Y. Suppose further that State Y has a maximum
limitation on the amount of damages recoverable for wrongful death but there
is no such limitation found upon the statutes in State X.
The above hypothetical presents many problems for the attorney representing
the dependents of Mr. Passenger or the administrator or executor of his estate in
a suit against the common-carrier. Wanting the highest money-judgment possible
the lawyer is primarily concerned with the procedure he must follow in order to
achieve this end. There would be no difficulty if both the contract and the injury
which resulted in death occurred in one state and the action were brought in that
state. The forum would apply its own law because it was the only state which
housed all the contacts with the parties involved.
However, the facts presented in the above hypothetical pose a problem in-
volving two jurisdictions, each having some contact with the parties involved;
State X being the place where the ticket was purchased, and State Y, the place
of injury. Under this situation there would seem to be two avenues of approach
for recovery: (1) An action for breach of contract of safe carriage, and (2) A
suit in tort under the proper wrongful death statute. Which road presents the
smallest number of pitfalls? Which road is more profitable so far as recovery is
concerned? This comment will explore these questions.
Contract Action Considered
As to the first avenue of approach-the sufficiency of the contract action of
safe carriage-it might be well to begin with an old English case in which Lord
Ellenbourough stated, by way of dictum, that "in a civil court the death of a
human being cannot be complained of as an injury."' That noted jurist based
his reasoning on the fact that at common law there was no right of recovery for
negligently causing the death of another. The rule, though considered unjust by
1 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
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many,2 prevailed in England and this country until the enactment of Lord Camp-
bell's Act' in 1846. The recovery of any damages arising from death through
negligence depended upon the existence of some statute. Lord Campbell's Act,
which made this type of recovery possible for the first time, is the predecessor of
our modern wrongful death statutes. Prior to its enactment, however, to recover
for a wrongful death involving a common-carrier the action would have to be
based upon contract for breach of safe carriage rather than upon tort.
4
Where death is caused by the breach of a carrier's implied contract of safe
carriage, the executor or administrator, although he could not sue in tort
[could] sue in contract, and recover damages suffered by the decedent's estate.5
In Dyke v. Erie Railway,6 the plaintiff purchased a ticket in New York from
the defendant. He was injured while passing through Pennsylvania enroute from
Attica, New York, to New York City. Suit was brought in New York. A Pennsyl-
vania statute limited recovery to $3,000 in actions against common-carriers for
personal injuries. The court of appeals refused to apply the limitation on the
ground that the contract of safe carriage was made in New York and was not
divisible. Its dependence was not upon the law of the place of injury but rather
upon the place where it was made. Therefore, the law of the forum governed.
In 1907 an action was brought to recover damages for defendant's failure to
properly transport plaintiff.7 The action stemmed from an alleged assault upon
the plaintiff by one of defendant's employees. The sole issue upon which the
decision was rendered, was whether the action was one in tort or contract. The
court affirming the decision below, in effect held that it was the latter, and in a
general way distinguished a tort from a breach of contract:
.. [The latter [contract) arises under an agreement of the parties; whereas
the tort ordinarily is a violation of a duty fixed by law, independent of con-
tract or the will of the parties, although it may sometimes have relation to
obligations growing out of or coincident with a contract and frequently the
same facts will sustain either class of action.'
The court further stated:
And so while it may be conceded that, independent of any express promise or
agreement, the defendant would have been subject to duties and obligations
in favor of plaintiff, the violation of which by the acts complained of in this
2 PROSSER, TORTS 710 (2d ed. 1955); 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 336 (3d ed. 1923); see also Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29
COLUM. L. REy. 239 (1929).
3 STAT. 9 and 10 VIcr. c. 93 (1846).4 TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT 21 (2d ed. 1913).
6Id. at 21.
645 N.Y. 113, 6 Am. Rep. 43 (1871). The court in its opinion, per Allen, J.,
reasoned that since the contracts were made in New York and the obligations were created
there it could not be assumed that the parties intended to subject the contract to the laws of
any other state. The act of transportation was one act which commenced and was completed
in the state of New York, although intermittingly crossed state lines into Pennsylvania and
New Jersey. The injury in Pennsylvania constituted a breach but since the contract was
indivisible the laws of New York i.e., the place where the contract was made, applied.
7 Busch v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 187 N.Y. 388, 80 N.E. 197 (1907).
8 Id. at 198.
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case would have amounted to a tort, that is not at all decisive that this action
was not and could not be brought in contract.9
The breach of contract actions brought in the Dyke case and the Busch case
resulted from personal injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. The injuries caused in
both cases did not result in death. This is where the distinction lies and is mate-
rial when determining whether a contract action may be maintained in an injury-
resulting-in-death case.
In Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines,10 plaintiff, as administratrix brought an
action in New York to recover for the death of her husband who had purchased
a ticket in New York for passage to Boston on defendant airlines. Plaintiff's
decedent was killed in an airplane crash in Connecticut. The lower court in
applying the Connecticut wrongful death statute, limited recovery to $20,000, the
maximum allowed under that statute." Denial of plaintiff's motion to add certain
interest to the judgment prompted an appeal. Plaintiff argued that:
.. . [A]n action to recover more than $20,000 will lie since the decedent
purchased his ticket in New York and there arose an implied contract safely
to transport, governed by the law of the place where the contract was made.' 2
The court ruled that the action was one based upon tort and therefore the law of
place where the injury governed. As to the addition of interest the court held:
The same reasoning that requires the application of the Connecticut law limit-
ing recovery to $20,000 makes it impossible to allow interest on the verdictfrom the date of decedent's death .... There is no similar provision allowing
interest in the Connecticut Act and that Act completely governs the recovery
and limits it to $20,000.12
The court cited the decision of the New York Supreme Court in Faron v.
Eastern Air Lines,'4 which dealt with the same accident involved in the Maynard
case. In Faron, the executrix sued in both contract and tort and sought to recover
under the New York law, though the accident occurred in Connecticut. The
Court, speaking through Justice Hofstadter held that:
As to the first and second causes of action, although they are couched in con-
tract language it is obvious that liability, if any, will be predicated upon proof
of negligence. Where, as here, the gravamen of the cause of action is an
alleged breach of a duty through negligence, the action is governed by the ap-
plicable law of torts, even though the allegations refer to a breach of con-
tract.15 (Italics added.)
9Id. at 198.
20 178 F.2d 139 (1949).
11 Connecticut has since abolished the maximum limitation of $20,000 and now has
unlimited liability. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. 5 52-555 (1958).
12 Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, supra note 10, at 140.
13 Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, supra note 10, at 141.
14 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1948).
15 Id. at 570. This view has been adopted by the New York courts in Carroll v.Staten Island R. Co., 58 N.Y. 126, 17 Am. Rep. 221 (1874); Loehr v. East Side Omnibus
Corp., 259 App. Div. 200, 18 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1940), af'd 287 N.Y. 670, 39 N.E.2d 290(1941); Manning v. 1234 Corp., 174 Misc. 36, 20 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1940), af'd 260 App.
Div. 914, 24 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1940), appeal denied 261 App. Div. 804, 25 N.Y.S.2d 780
(1941).
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It would perhaps be more profitable for plaintiff to sue in contract, if such
were permissible under the circumstances, where to sue in tort would subject the
plaintiff to the limitations of the foreign law under its wrongful death statute.
It seems, however, that under the great weight of authority a contract action would
not be available in the hypothetical situation presented at the outset of this paper.
Tort Action Considered
In a wrongful death suit there is no rule that gives a right of action for
breach of contract of safe carriage and allowing the law of the forum to govern.
A reason for this may be that the executor or dependents of the decedent were not
parties to the contract of carriage and therefore do not have an actionable right
under such contract as they would have under a tort action. The tort action is
not derived from the person of the decedent but is born from the tortious act
itself. It is suggested that had the decedent survived, the contract action would
then be available. Death terminates the contract action.
"Death by wrongful act" denotes neglect or default on the part of the
defendant. The gravamen of the cause of action is tort since the defendant's duty
was breached through negligence. It is a well settled rule that the lex loci delicti
governs such a case. 6 It is equally well settled that the right to maintain an action
for wrongful death is dependent upon the existence of a statute creating that right
at the place where the injury occurred. 17 Each state gives a remedy for wrongful
death." Some state statutes have a maximum limitation of damages recoverable,"
and others have unlimited liability."
In the hypothetical above, the decedent was killed in a jurisdiction having
a maximum limitation under its wrongful death statute. Under the weight of
authority the application of the lex loci delicti is the only approach. However,
this may not be desirable to the plaintiff especially when it is obvious that the
limitation would make recovery inadequate. This is the problem.
Perhaps modern conditions have made it difficult and to some extent unjust
and anomalous to subject the citizens of a state to the various laws of other states
while traveling through or over them. Perhaps one who engages in such modern
and convenient travel at least impliedly consents to subjection of the laws of the
16RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 et. seq., (1934); Faron v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1948).
17Compare list in TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT xvii (1st ed. 1893), with
the data found in IV MARTENDALE-HUBBELL, LAW DIGESTS (1960 ed.). See also
Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11, 21 (1881). Query: Do all states provide at least
some statutory remedy for wrongful death? See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300
U.S. 342 (1937).
18 See 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 141 (1959); Wein Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Simmonds,
241 F.2d 57 (9 Cir. 1957).
19 Massachusetts now has a maximum of $20,000; Illinois limits liability to $30,000.
20 E.g., Connecticut and New York are among those states which have unlimited
liability.
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states in which the accident occurs. But generally, the place of injury in transpor-
tation cases is entirely fortuitous.
21
Today it is not the statutory right of action, but the statutory remedy as to its
limitations which causes concern. Courts in states with unlimited liability have the
troublesome problem of enforcing foreign wrongful death statutes with maximum
limitations. In some instances to apply the foreign law would be offensive to the
public policy of the forum. Consequently some courts have not adhered to the
place of injury rule in its entirety. 22 Recently a New York court held that to
apply that part of the Massachusetts statute limiting the extent of recovery to
$15,000 was against the public policy of New York and thereby refused to do so. 23
Defendant, in that case, was a common-carrier. Plaintiff's intestate was a passenger
on one of defendant's airplanes and was killed when the plane crashed and burned
in Massachusetts enroute from a New York airport. Plaintiff's first cause of action
was a suit under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute which subjected the
plaintiff to the $15,000 limitation. The court unanimously agreed that Massa-
chusetts was the place where the wrong was committed and that the law of Massa-
chusetts governed. However, the majority reasoned that to apply the limitation of
that state was against New York public policy and therefore refused to apply that
portion of the statute.
Plaintiff's second cause of action was one based upon contract. The court
dismissed this cause holding that the plaintiff acting as administrator had no
separate right to sue the carrier in contract for causing the death of his (plain-
tiff's) intestate.2 4 Had this cause been upheld, the law of the forum i.e. New
York (the place where the contract was made) would have applied and recovery
would have been unlimited. Needless to say however, since the court refused to
apply the Massachusetts limitation plaintiff had not become a victim of subjection.
At common law, in an action at law before the trial court, death of a party
resulted in absolute abatement without right of substitution of decedent's repre-
sentative.2 In equity it signified a present suspension of all proceedings in the
21 Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 A. 775 (1936) impliedly demonstrates the fortuitous
nature of the place of injury.
22 Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947); Kyle v. Kyle, 210
Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941); See e.g. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York. 224
N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918), involving a wrongful death claim wherein Justice Cardozo
stated: "The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of thejudges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors,
unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."
25Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961). At the
time of the accident, Massachusetts law limited to $15,000 the amount of damages that could
be collected for negligence contributing to a person's death. The limit has since been raised
to $20,000.24 Webber v. Herkimer, 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358 (1888).
25 Walker v. Burkham, 68 Nev. 250, 229 P.2d 158 (1951).
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event of the death of one of the parties. 26 But, whether the cause of action survives
is a matter governed by the law of the place where the wrong was committed.2 "
The decision in the Kilberg case may well open the door to an abandonment
of the maximum limitations that are present in some of the wrongful death
statutes. Professor J. H. C. Morris, 8 a well-known English authority on conflict
of laws, has written, that "To a foreign observer, it seems extraordinary that there
should be so much uncertainty in the United States as to what law governs the
validity of a contract, and so much uncritical acceptance of the rule that tort
liability is governed by the law of the place of the wrong." 29 This "uncritical
acceptance of the rule" has recently been criticized, s0 and perhaps with justification.
According to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,s the proper law to govern
torts is the place of injury. The Restatement rule is supported by much authority.32
Presumably in a tort action a forum should apply the lex loci delicti in its entirety.
But apparently strong public policy can and has limited the application of the rule
in New York. Some jurisdictions have held the foreign law to be penal, 3 while
others, finding it to be remedial, 4 have applied the law of the forum.
In Slater v. Mexican National R.R. Co., 5 suit was brought in a federal court
in Texas for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent, an American citizen work-
ing as a brakeman. The injury occurred in Mexico. Under Mexican law the
plaintiffs were entitled to support. The trial court authorized the jury to assess
these rights to support, and entered judgment for a lump sum. After reversal by
the circuit court of appeals, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes held that the common law afforded no machinery for
assessing the present value of the plaintiffs' claims under Mexican law.
But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it
follows that that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation,
but equally determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow a plaintiff
to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law for the foundation of
his case, and yet to deny the defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on
26 Fiegenbaum v. McFarlane, 399 Il. 367, 77 N.E.2d 816 (1948).
is a matter governed by the law of the place where the wrong was committed.
27
27 Allen v. Whitehall Pharmacal Co., 115 F. Supp. 7 (S. D. N.Y. 1953).
28 Mr. Morris is a Fellow and Tutor of Magdalen College, Oxford, and All Souls Lec-
turer in Private International Law at Oxford. He was a visiting professor at Harvard Law
School in 1950-51.
29 Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARv. L. REV. 881, 883 (1951).
30 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 23.
31 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 377 et. seq., (1934).
82 See BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, chapter 9 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
chapter 6 (3d ed. 1949).
s Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 A. 711 (1913); Gardner v. N.Y. & N.E.
Ry. Co., 17 R.I. 790, 24 A. 831 (1892); Adams v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 67 Vt. 76, 30 A.
687 (1894). See also Raisor v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 215 Ill. 47, 74 N.E. 69 (1905).
s4 Hill v. B. & M. R.R. Co., 77 N.H. 151, 89 A. 482 (1914); Mallory v. Am. Hide &
Leather Co., 148 F. 482 (1st Cir. 1906). See also Whitlow v. Nashville R.R. Co., 114
Tenn. 344, 84 S.W. 618 (1904).
35 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
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his liability that law would improve. .-. . Therefore we may lay on one side
the notion that the law of the place of the act may be resorted to so far as to
show that the act was a tort, and then may be abandoned, leaving the conse-
quences to be determined according to the accident of the place where the
defendant may happen to be caught.3 6
Decedent's widow could have sued successfully in Mexico under Mexican law
and received annuities for life. A decree for similar relief could not be entered
by a federal court sitting in Texas. To enter a judgment for a lump sum based
upon the value of what the widow would ultimately receive from the Mexican
court would be to award her something other than she would get under Mexican
law. Therefore no action could be allowed. The Court adhered to the conflict of
laws rule so strictly that the "uncritical acceptance of the rule" which Morris
speaks about is certainly without exaggeration. The Court apparently did not find
that the "foreign law" was either offensive to the public policy of Texas, penal,
or remedial in nature.
Conceding the premise that the rule should be applied in its entirety there is
a possible solution to the problem. The creation of a uniform wrongful death
law would undoubtedly expunge the burdensome restrictions and limitations in
the various existing wrongful death acts.37 It would perhaps abate the attempts
made by plaintiffs to circumvent the "limited liability" statutes by pleading a
contract cause of action. One writer is of the opinion that "The courts could then
give articulate interpretation to the wrongful death in interstate and international
aviation acts and arrive at a sounder reason for allowing breach of contract to be
actionable (under a 'neglect' theory)." 3 A uniform wrongful death act should
include a minimum limitation to provide for the loss which is invariably suffered
by death to the remaining survivors where there has been no actual proof that the
survivors have sustained any financial loss but where justice demands some re-
covery. The initial concern is in dealing with the death of minor children and
elderly decedents who are for all practical purposes either too young or too old to
render any financial assistance to the family. On the other hand a greater problem
is in dealing with persons whose financial capabilities or potentials are immeas-
urable. For instance a young executive of a large manufacturing organization
whose income may well be in excess of $75,000 per year and whose earning
a Id. at 126.
37 Because of the great diversity of damage awards under similar facts but differentjurisdictions, several writers have advocated uniform wrongful death law among the several
states. See McCORMICK, DAMAGES 364 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS S 105 (1955); TIFFANY,
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT IV (2d ed. 1913); Meyer, A New Death Act, 43 DICK. L.
REv. 83 (1939).
asProminski, Wrongful Death In Aviation: State, Federal, and Warsaw, 15 MIAMI
L. REv. 59, 66 (Fall, 1960).
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capacity, had he lived, would have netted him well over a million dollars. Today
it is conceivable that a man may earn a very large sum in his executive or pro-
fessional capacity."9 In this kind of situation it would seem unjust to allow only
a limited recovery of $15,000 or $20,000. The jury should be allowed to assess the
damages according to the circumstances regarding the earning capacity and
potentials of the decedent being hampered by a limited liability statute. This is
not the problem in states with unlimited liability statutes. Fortunately these states
are in the majority.40 A uniform wrongful death act should give unlimited lia-
bility so as not to subject the plaintiff to the barrier of a limitation.
A state should provide protection, whenever possible, to its citizens. When
the application of a foreign law results in depriving local citizens of just benefits,
he forum should refuse application of such a law on the ground of its being
repugnant to public policy.41
At the present the only approach recognized by the courts and which presents
the smallest number of pitfalls is the tort action. However, in many instances it is
not the most profitable, nor the most just. Unless a court is willing to refuse to
apply the limitation portion of the foreign law on the grounds of a public policy
prohibition or that the statute is in some way penal or remedial, plaintiff will be
saddled with the lex loci delicti.
The issue to be determined in a legal controversy concerning the law of the
state which is to govern has been answered by the application of the principles of
conflict of laws. This answer is not always thought to be the correct or just one.
The final determination of the case regarding the amount of money damages
recoverable depends chiefly on the state law which governs. In a wrongful death
case the place of injury may be entirely fortuitous and consequently subject the
plaintiff to many undesirable limitations. Pleading a breach of contract of safe
carriage where the issue is negligence has failed. A contract action in this kind of
case does not survive the decedent.
States which impose maximum limitations on wrongful death actions present
the greatest problem and are not always followed. It is submitted that a uniform
wrongful death act may be the answer to the problem confronting the forum when
application of the lex loci delicti and its limitations is necessary. In some instances
strong public policy has precluded the courts from applying the foreign law. It
seems however, that under the weight of authority the only avenue of approach
for wrongful death is the tort action which leaves the plaintiff subjected to the
law of the place of injury.
DAVID J. PAPALLO
59 In O'Toole v. U.S., 242 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1957), the decedent had an earning
capacity of $250,000 a year. Recovery of $400,000 for the widow was not considered ex-
cessive.
40 See note 17 supra.
41 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
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